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Sympathy  is usually  evoked  by heightened  awareness  of and concern  for others’  suffering
by perceiving  or  reacting  to  their distress  or  need.  Sympathetic  contexts  appear  to  spur cre-
ative  solutions,  because  those  who  react  sympathetically  to others’  suffering  tend  to  seek
novel, desirable,  and  prosocial  solutions  that  alleviate  suffering  and  promote  well-being.
We  conducted  two  studies  to  investigate  whether  sympathy  enhances  creativity.  Study  1
tested  the  feasibility  of  using  images  of distressed  elderly  as  an  unobtrusive  method  to
induce sympathy.  Study  2 sought  to determine  whether  induced  sympathy  promotes  cre-
ativity,  and  whether  individual  differences  in  trait  empathy  moderate  this  effect.  Results
demonstrate  that  sympathy  fosters  creative  originality  –  but  not  creative  ﬂuency  or  ﬂex-
ibility – as assessed  by either  content-general  or content-speciﬁc  creativity  measures.  In
addition, the  beneﬁcial  effect  of sympathy  on originality  is  moderated  by  individual  differ-
ences  in  trait  empathy.  The  potential  mechanisms  that  underlie  these  effects  are  discussed.
© 2016  Elsevier  Ltd.  All rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
Sympathy1 is usually evoked by heightened awareness of and concern for others’ suffering by perceiving or reacting
to their distress or need (Chismar, 1988; Decety & Michalska, 2010; Wispé, 1991). Sympathy has been regarded as one
of the most valuable emotions, because it is intimately tied to prosocial and moral behaviors such as low discrimination,
cooperation, sharing, helping, supporting, and protecting others (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley,
& Birch, 1981; de Waal, 2004; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988; Holmgren, Eisenberg, & Fabes,
1998). Considerable attention has therefore been paid to the behavioral consequences of sympathy (e.g., various prosocial
behaviors), while surprisingly little has been given to the cognitive consequences of sympathy. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that sympathy inﬂuences our thinking and problem-solving skills. For instance, a group of medical professionals
who joined several medical mission trips to underdeveloped countries felt sympathy for the critical shortages of supplies in
∗ Corresponding authors.
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1 It is noteworthy that although sympathy and empathy are often used interchangeably, they are not identical (Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). Sympathy
is  sorrow for a distressed or needy person without sharing the other’s relevant emotion, while empathy also seeks to share the person’s emotional state
(Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Gladstein, 1983; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). Therefore, sympathy occurs in an emotionally negative context (e.g.,
pity,  sorrow, or concern), whereas empathy can occur in both positive and negative emotional contexts (Wispé, 1991). For the purposes of this study, we
limit  our focus to sympathy and its impact on creativity.
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those countries, and was inspired to collect unused but clean surgical supplies (e.g., gloves. sutures, and drapes) that would
otherwise be disposed of in U.S. hospitals. Similarly, Robbins et al. (1994) found that physicians who are more sympathetic
to their patients’ psychological distress tend to be more accurate in their assessments and diagnoses. These ﬁndings suggest
that the experience of sympathy may  improve the ability to produce distinctive and constructive ideas, which are linked to
important aspects of creative cognition (Ward, Smith, & Fink, 1999).
Given the lack of studies that seek to understand the cognitive outcomes of sympathy, we  set out to examine the effects
of sympathy on creativity—that is, the ability to generate novel and useful ideas by exploring a range of possible solutions
(Amabile, 1996; Decety & Michalska, 2010). A link between sympathy and creativity is plausible for several reasons. First,
sympathy may  foster creativity through its affective route. In general, a situation that engenders sympathy is usually linked
to undesirable events; therefore, sympathetic emotions are considered to be negative emotions. Regarding the link between
negative emotions and creativity, the feelings-as-information model suggests that negative emotions signal problems that
require greater effort and improvement, and therefore stimulate creativity when making changes or seeking adequate
solutions (Frijda, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). In a related vein, the mood-as-input model suggests that negative emotions
signal problems or danger in a given context and evoke more effortful and systematic strategies to tackle the problem (Martin
& Stoner, 1996). Similarly, growing evidence indicates that the effect of negative emotions on creativity is largely context
dependent (George & Zhou, 2002; Leung et al., 2014). This contextual view suggests that negative emotions can be beneﬁcial
to creativity, especially in a context in which negative emotions are clearly identiﬁed, and their perceived recognition and
rewards for creative solutions are highly regarded (George & Zhou, 2002). Noting that sympathy induced by one person’s
suffering can be the catalyst for strategies to end the suffering of others in a similar plight (Lee & Dow, 2011; Lyubomirksy,
Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; Piliavin, Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Wispé, 1991), sympathetic contexts appear to
spur creative solutions. Lastly, in consideration of the dual-pathway model—which assumes that negative emotions inﬂuence
creativity via the persistence pathway, which refers to the degree of sustained, task-directed cognitive effort—it is plausible
that sympathy’s affective inﬂuence fosters creative action (Martin & Stoner, 1996).
Second, sympathy’s motivational route may  enhance creativity. When people are intrinsically motivated, they tend to
engage in an activity for their own enjoyment or the challenge it presents. The literature suggests that intrinsic motivation
is conducive to creative performance because it facilitates exploration, spontaneity, ﬂexibility, persistence, and interest—all
of which are linked to creative processes (Amabile, 1996; Deci, Koestner, &, Ryan, 1999; Elsbach & Hargadon, 2006; Grant
& Berry, 2011; Reeve & Deci, 1996; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004). Given this literature, the link between sympathy and
intrinsic motivation is credible: Those who react sympathetically to others’ suffering tend to be motivated to alleviate
suffering and seek novel, desirable, and prosocial solutions that promote well-being. This, in turn, may  afford the greatest
opportunities for learning and exploration (Hepach et al., 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In support of this view, Grant and Berry
(2011) demonstrate that intrinsic motivation with other-focused, prosocial motives fosters the production of novel ideas
(i.e., originality). Sympathy, therefore, likely promotes creativity through its motivational route.
Third, sympathy may  foster creativity through perspective taking. Sympathy is largely evoked by affective perspective
taking, which often promotes a shift from a self-centered view to an other-centered view and, in turn, facilitates the inte-
gration of diverse views in a meaningful way (Lamm,  Batson, & Decety, 2007). In favor of this notion, Grant and Berry (2011)
propose that other-focused psychological processes play an important role in entertaining ideas that are not only novel but
also valuable, because they may  be useful in addressing others’ problems or needs (Mohrman, Gibson, & Mohrman, 2001).
Given that perspective taking is thought to be one of the most important psychological forces underlying creativity (Decety
& Jackson, 2004; Lamm et al., 2007; Parker, Atkins & Axtell, 2008), sympathy – which promotes this ability – is likely to
enhance the ﬂexibility aspect of creativity.
In light of the credible link between sympathy and creativity, our primary research goal was  to determine whether
induced sympathy improves creativity. We  also employed a rather unobtrusive method to induce sympathy. As stated
earlier, sympathy involves feelings of pity or sorrow for another’s distress. Unlike empathy, however, it does not require that
we share the other’s relevant experiences or emotions (Lee, 2009; Wispé, 1991). Therefore, caution should be exercised when
inducing sympathy that does not implicate empathy. The literature, for instance, has often induced sympathy by asking a
participant to envision how a person who is described as experiencing tragic circumstances must feel (e.g., Harmon-Jones,
Vaughn-Scott, Mohr, Sigelman, & Harmon-Jones, 2004). Despite the assumed effectiveness of these methods, it is possible
that they may  inadvertently induce empathic feelings. In Study 1, therefore, we  tested the feasibility of using images of
distressed elderly as an unobtrusive method of inducing sympathy for the elderly.
Study 2 aimed to determine whether participants in whom sympathy had been induced would outperform participants
in the control group in creative performance, as assessed by (a) two domain-general tests of creativity, the Unusual Uses Test
(Guilford, 1959) and the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (Wallach & Kogan, 1965), and (b) one domain-speciﬁc test, the Floor
Plan Test, which asks the participant to generate ideas that can help the elderly. We  examined creative performance across
four dimensions: originality, ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and elaboration. In view of the three potential routes that can facilitate
creativity (affective, motivational, and perspective taking), we hypothesized that sympathy would particularly beneﬁt two
aspects of creativity – originality and ﬂexibility – but not necessarily the third, ﬂuency.
We also sought to determine whether individual differences in trait empathy – the general ability to perceive, understand,
feel, and share another’s feelings and sensations – would modulate the impact of sympathy on creativity. It is probable that
those who have a greater tendency to feel empathic are also more likely to experience sympathy for others’ troubles. Given the
134 H. Yang, S. Yang / Thinking Skills and Creativity 21 (2016) 132–143
Table 1
Critical measures as a function of induced sympathy in Study 1.
Study 1 Induced Sympathy (n = 38) Control (n = 37) t
Demographics
Age 21.3 (1.91) 21.7 (1.81) −0.93
Gender  (male: female)a 11:27 14:24 0.67
Ageism as a manipulation check
Avoidance 2.48 (0.43) 2.73 (0.43) 2.48*
Antilocution 2.43 (0.59) 2.64 (0.48) 1.67
Discrimination 2.21 (0.42) 2.18 (0.47) 0.29
Mood  and arousal
Pleasant 4.03 (2.3) 3.73 (2.0) 1.65
Unpleasant 1.76 (1.9) 1.76 (1.6) 0.04
Tense  2.13 (2.5) 2.08 (2.1) 0.21
Energetic 3.76 (2.0) 3.38 (1.6) 1.71
Note: SDs are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05.
a Chi-square test was  performed instead of an independent-samples t-test.
close link between sympathy and empathy, therefore, it is important to elucidate potential interactions between trait-level
empathic abilities and state-level sympathetic feelings.
2. Study 1
We  had two goals in Study 1. First, we investigated whether sympathy could be induced through exposure to images of
distressed elderly without directly asking participants to sympathize with them. Given the literature suggesting that the
experience of sympathy begins by giving attention to a person or group in need (Dickert & Slovic, 2009), we  tested whether
paying sufﬁcient attention to images of people who were suffering could induce sympathy without a concomitant effort to
sympathize with them. Second, we examined whether sympathy that had been inconspicuously induced could be checked
by an unobtrusive manipulation check instead of an explicit self-report measure. This is because directly asking participants
to rate the extent to which they feel sympathetic might dispel the induced emotional state by causing them to be suspicious
of the study’s purpose (Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2013). Therefore, we reasoned that if participants feel sympathetic at the sight of
suffering elderly, they will be more willing to approach and help them, and therefore less likely to avoid social interactions
with the elderly (Batson et al., 1997). To this end, we  employed the avoidance subscale of ageism – which measures prejudice
against the elderly based on negative attitudes toward and stereotypes about aging – as an implicit manipulation check on
induced sympathy (Fraboni, Saltstone, & Hughes, 1990). We  expected that if sympathy had been successfully induced, the
sympathy condition would report lower avoidance tendency toward the elderly.
2.1. Participants
Seventy-ﬁve undergraduates participated in the study in exchange for extra course credit. Participants were randomly
assigned to either the control condition (n = 37; male = 11; Mage = 21.7, SD = 1.81) or the sympathy condition (n = 38; male = 14;
Mage = 21.3, SD = 1.91; for details, see Table 1). There were more females than males in each condition, but their ratios did
not differ signiﬁcantly.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Pictures of afﬂicted elderly
Thirty-three images of elderly persons who appeared ill, poor, hungry, feeble, unhealthy, pathetic, or exhausted were
selected from publicly available online sources and edited to highlight their suffering.
2.2.2. The Fraboni Ageism Scale (FAS)
The avoidance subscale of the FAS – which is known to measure negative attitudes toward and stereotypes about the
elderly – was employed as an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy toward the elderly (Fraboni et al., 1990).
The FAS consists of 29 items in three subscales: antilocution (antagonism based on misconceptions about elderly people), dis-
crimination (discriminatory opinions regarding the political rights, segregation, or activities of elderly people), and avoidance
(withdrawal from social contact with elderly people).
2.3. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the sympathy condition or control condition. Both groups were ﬁrst asked
to rate their current mood (pleasant or unpleasant) and arousal (energetic or tense) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1
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(very much disagree) to 5 (very much agree). Participants in the sympathy condition were then shown 33 pictures of afﬂicted
elderly and asked to rate (a) the extent of the person’s need, (b) the feelings (negative, neutral, or positive) the person was
experiencing, and (c) the person’s vulnerability. This was done not only to examine the images’ effectiveness, but to ensure
that participants were paying attention to the elderly person in each image. In contrast, participants in the control condition
watched a 7-min slide show (a total of 30 slides) on strategies for promoting health that was  purely text-based (i.e., without
any images of the elderly) and were told to focus on the text and remember it for a later memory test. Immediately after
this, both groups completed the 29-item ageism scale (FAS) – which was  combined with 29 unrelated ﬁller items to avoid
participants’ suspicion of the scale’s purpose – as an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy. Participants were
then debriefed and thanked.
3. Results
3.1. Induced sympathy and manipulation check
A series of independent-samples t-tests showed that the two groups were equivalent in their reported mood (pleasant,
unpleasant) and arousal (tense, energetic) at the outset, all ps > 0.09 (see Table 1).
Participants’ sympathetic judgments of the images of distressed elderly were examined by a series of one-sample t-tests
for a difference between mean rating scores and the midpoint of the 5-point Likert scale, (i.e., zero), which indicates either
neutrality or abstinence. Overall, the older adults in the images were judged to be experiencing signiﬁcantly greater need
and negative emotion – t(37) = 2.27, p = 0.029 and t(37) = −3.2, p = 0.003, respectively – and marginally greater vulnerability,
t(37) = 1.82, p = 0.07. Given that sympathy arises from acknowledging others’ need, emotional distress, or vulnerability, this
suggests that the pictures were effective in inducing sympathetic judgments, i.e., heightened awareness of the need, negative
feelings, and vulnerability of the elderly in images.
We examined whether exposure to the images of afﬂicted elderly induced sympathetic feelings toward the elderly. If so,
such exposure would evoke prosocial attitudes about approaching or interacting with the elderly, i.e., reduced avoidance
tendency (Batson et al., 1997). We  found that those in the sympathy condition scored signiﬁcantly lower for avoidance
tendency (e.g., less reluctance to make eye contact or converse with elderly people) than those in the control condition who
watched a slide show, instead of images of the afﬂicted elderly, t(73) = 2.48, p = 0.015, Cohen’s d = 0.57. Group differences
were not present in overall ageism, p = 0.094, or the other subscales of ageism, antilocution and discrimination, ps > 0.14,
suggesting discriminant validity that induced sympathy facilitates prosocial attitudes (i.e., lower avoidance), but does not
alleviate other subscales of general discrimination against the elderly. Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that the use of
images of the afﬂicted elderly is effective for unobtrusively eliciting sympathy; in addition, the avoidance subscale can serve
as an implicit manipulation check on induced sympathy toward the elderly.
4. Study 2
We  had two goals for the second study. First, we sought to determine whether induced sympathy promotes creativity.
Second, since a sympathetic response is more likely to be elicited when one’s trait level of empathic concern is high (Davis,
2009; Eisenberg, 2000), we aimed to determine whether individual differences in dispositional empathy would moderate
the effect of sympathy on creativity.
To make our sympathy condition comparable to the control condition, both groups viewed the same slide show about
strategies for promoting health that the control group in Study 1 watched. The only difference between the two  groups was
that while the control group watched the text-only version, the sympathy group watched a version that contained both text
and images of the afﬂicted elderly.
5. Methods
5.1. Participants
One hundred and seventeen undergraduates took part in the study for extra course credit (for details, see Table 2).
Participants were told that the study’s purpose was  to examine individual differences in memory performance and randomly
assigned to either the sympathy (n = 62, male = 14; Mage = 21.5, SD = 1.9) or the control condition (n = 55, male = 17; Mage = 21.1,
SD = 1.87).2
5.2. Materials
5.2.1. Sympathy induction
The same 7-min slide show that was used with the control group in Study 1 was  used with both groups in Study 2, but
each group viewed a different version. As described previously, each of 30 slides contained useful strategies for maintaining
health, which were used for a later memory test. The control condition watched the text-only version of the slide show (i.e.,
without any images), while the sympathy condition watched a version that included images of the distressed elderly. For
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Table 2
Demographics and critical measures as a function of induced sympathy in Study 2.
Induced Sympathy (n = 62) Control (n = 55) t
Demographic variables
Age 21.5 (1.91) 21.1 (1.87) −1.09
Gender (male: female)a 14:48 17:38 0.31
Family  type a,b 12:49 6:48 1.59
Frequency of visiting grandparentsc 3.4 (2.95) 2.7(2.85) −1.32
Ageism as a manipulation check
Avoidance 2.37 (0.51) 2.56 (0.46) 2.08*
Antilocution 6.68 (1.23) 7.05 (1.09) 1.74
Discrimination 2.09 (0.37) 2.08 (0.41) −0.12
Mood  and arousal
Pleasant 4.37 (2.1) 4.0 (2.19) −0.94
Unpleasant 3.39 (2.46) 3.27 (2.51) −0.25
Tense  2.68 (2.1) 2.38 (1.98) −0.79
Energetic 2.84 (1.75) 2.89 (1.91) 0.88
Trait  empathy
General empathy 3.74 (0.51) 3.77 (0.38) −0.27
Empathetic suffering 4.06 (0.51) 4.08 (0.59) 0.23
Positive sharing 4.15 (0.55) 4.05 (0.73) −0.88
Responsive crying 3.4 (1.1) 3.35 (1.1) −0.22
Emotional attention 3.75 (0.43) 3.67 (0.59) −0.82
Feeling  for others 3.39 (0.65) 3.19 (0.66) −1.68
Emotional contagion 3.43 (0.62) 3.35 (0.84) −0.59
Note: SDs are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
a Chi-square was performed instead of an independent-samples t-test.
b Family type: 0 = extended family; 1 = nuclear family.
c Frequency of visiting grandparents: 1 = once a month; 2 = once every 1–2 months; 3 = once every 3–4 months; 4 = once every 5–6 months; 5 = once
every 7–8 months; 6 = once every 9–10 months.
instance, a slide on the importance of exercise was  accompanied by the image of an elderly person suffering from severe joint
pain while exercising. That is, our two conditions were comparable in encoding health-related information as the primary
task, which in turn rendered our sympathy-induction procedure more unobtrusive. As in Study 1, the avoidance subscale of
ageism was used as an implicit manipulation check for induced sympathy (Fraboni et al., 1990).
5.2.2. The Unusual Uses Task (UUT)
The UUT has been widely employed to assess the ability to generate unusual uses for a common object, such as a garbage
bag (Guilford, 1959; Torrance, 1974). Participants were told to list as many uses for common objects as possible without
limiting themselves to uses they had previously seen or heard about. Responses on the UUT were coded on dimensions of orig-
inality, ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and elaboration. Given the literature that suggests that objective scoring technique seems optimal
for scoring originality on abstract tasks (Plucker et al., 2014), a statistical-infrequency technique was used to assess original-
ity in terms of the uniqueness and rarity of the given response relative to the range of ideas generated by all participants.2
Speciﬁcally, 1 point was assigned to responses given by at least 5% of the participants and 2 points to those given by 1%
or less of the participants; these scores were summed across items for each creativity task and used as an index of orig-
inality. Fluency was measured by the total number of responses the participant generated. We  also calculated corrected
originality scores by dividing the originality score by the ﬂuency score (i.e., corrected originality = originality/ﬂuency). We
did this because the literature suggests that ﬂuency inﬂuences originality (e.g., Plucker, Qian, & Schmalensee, 2014; Runco
& Dow, 2004; Silvia, 2008), such that participants generate more novel responses as they list more responses. Flexibility
was measured by the total number of distinct categories of unusual uses. To reliably score ﬂexibility, we  developed our own
category-coding schemes based on a database comprising approximately 300 participants. Speciﬁcally, for the unusual task
our coding scheme delineated 12 categories for a newspaper and 9 categories for a cup. Lastly, we  assessed elaboration,
which indicates how detailed a participant’s response is. One point was assigned for more nuanced responses, with details
that specify a given category (e.g., a mold to make a sandcastle for one use of a cup). Scores were then summed to generate a
total elaboration score for each participant. All ratings were performed by two  independent raters, and their inter-rater reli-
2 Previous studies suggest that although it is more common to assess originality by counting responses provided by less than 20% of the sample, its
reliability estimation does not differ from the technique of counting responses provided either 5% or 10% of the sample, suggesting that the degree of
infrequency does not greatly inﬂuence reliability evidence (e.g., Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 2011). We also assessed originality by following the percentage
scoring  method which is known as the most appropriate strategy (e.g., Plucker et al., 2011). In this method, we  calculated percentage scores by dividing
the  number of original ideas by the total number of ideas generated. Our results did not differ from the pattern of results based on a statistical infrequency
method: The sympathy condition generated signiﬁcantly more original ideas than the control condition in the three creativity tasks, all ps < .05.
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ability, measured by intra-class correlation coefﬁcients, was signiﬁcant for ﬂuency (r = 0.99), originality (r = 0.98), ﬂexibility
(r = 0.98), and elaboration (r = 0.97), all ps < 0.01.
5.2.3. The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)
Similar to the UUT, the WKCT requires the participant to come up with as many items as possible that contain a certain
feature speciﬁed by the task (e.g., things that are round). Responses on the WKCT were scored on four dimensions of creativity:
originality (and corrected originality), ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and elaboration. Flexibility was scored based on 18 categories of
things that are round and 16 categories of things that make noise. All ratings were performed by two independent raters,
and their inter-rater reliability was signiﬁcant for originality (r = 0.96), ﬂuency (r = 0.98), ﬂexibility (r = 0.98), and elaboration
(r = 0.97), all ps < 0.01.
5.2.4. The Floor Plan Task (FPT)
In the FPT, which served as a domain-speciﬁc measure of creativity, participants were given a simpliﬁed ﬂoor plan of a
typical ofﬁce reception area and asked to modify the ﬂoor plan to make it a friendlier place for the elderly. For example,
participants might propose replacing a solid door with one that has a window, so that older adults would be able to see
someone approaching on the other side and react accordingly. Participants were strongly encouraged to generate as many
ideas as possible. Responses on the FPT were again scored on originality (and corrected originality), ﬂuency, ﬂexibility –
which was scored based on 6 categories – and elaboration. All ratings were performed by two  independent raters, and their
inter-rater reliability was signiﬁcant for ﬂuency (r = 0.99), ﬂexibility (r = 0.92), originality (r = 0.96), and elaboration (r =0.98),
all ps < 0.01.
5.2.5. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)
Given the postulated link between sympathy and individual differences in trait-level empathic concern, trait-level empa-
thy was measured using the EES (Caruso & Mayer, 1998). The EES consists of six subscales: empathic suffering (e.g., “The
suffering of others deeply disturbs me”), positive sharing (e.g., “Seeing other people smile makes me  smile”), responsive cry-
ing (e.g., “I cry easily when watching a sad movie”), emotional attention (e.g., “I don’t give others’ feelings much thought”),
feeling for others (e.g., “It’s easy for me  to get carried away by other people’s emotions”), and emotional contagion (e.g., “When
I’m with other people who are laughing, I join in”). The scale consists of 30 items scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). A previous study (Caruso & Mayer, 1998) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78.
5.3. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the sympathy or control condition. Participants in the sympathy condition
watched the 7-min slide show designed to induce sympathy (i.e., the version with images of afﬂicted elderly), while those
in the control condition watched the same slide show without any images. All participants were then asked to complete the
avoidance subscale, which served as a manipulation check on induced sympathy. Working at their own pace, participants
then took the UUT (for two items, newspapers and cups), the WKCT (for two items, things that are round and things that
make noise), and the FPT to assess creativity. The order of those creativity tasks was counterbalanced. Lastly, participants
completed a background survey (e.g., age, family type, frequency of visiting grandparents), the trait-empathy scale, and a
short mood questionnaire that asked participants to rate their current feelings and arousal (i.e., pleasant, unpleasant, tense,
energetic) using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all)  to 9 (very much so).  Finally, participants completed a funnel
questionnaire about what they believed the study’s purpose to be. They were then debriefed and thanked.
6. Results
6.1. Manipulation check
Consistent with previous results, the sympathy condition had signiﬁcantly lower scores on the avoidance scale (M = 2.37)
than the control condition (M = 2.56), t(115) = 2.08, p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.39 (see Table 2). The sympathy group’s lower
tendency to avoid the elderly indicated that they felt more sympathetic toward the afﬂicted elderly than their counterparts
in the control group. Further analyses revealed that the two groups did not differ in demographic variables, self-rated arousal,
mood states, or trait-level empathy, ps > 0.15.
6.2. Effect of sympathy on creativity
Table 3 presents an overall correlation matrix for all variables. Table 4 presents scores for three different types of creativity
tasks as a function of induced sympathy. We  report separate results for each creativity task below.3
3 Our chi-square analysis showed that both sympathy and control conditions had similar gender ratios, with more females than males (see Table 2).
However, a series of independent t-tests (adjusted by Bonferroni correction) indicates that males and females did not differ in terms of their performance
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Table 3
Pearson Correlations among Various Indicators of Creativity.
1a 2a 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Sympathy group –
2.  Gender 0.09 –
The Unusual Uses Task (UUT)
3. Originality 0.09 −0.14 –
4.  Fluency 0.001 −0.07 0.53** –
5. Flexibility −0.09 −0.12 0.53** 0.89** –
6  Elaboration 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.26** 0.18* –
The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)
7.  Originality 0.23* 0.03 0.40** 0.46** 0.39** 0.26** –
8  Fluency 0.01 0.09 0.25** 0.51** 0.48** 0.34** 0.63** –
9.  Flexibility −0.06 0.11 0.31** 0.54** 0.52** 0.31** 0.57** 0.87*** –
10.  Elaboration 0.03 −0.06 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.32** 0.23* 0.21* 0.27* –
The  Floor PlanTask (FTP)
11. Originality 0.22* 0.03 0.31** 0.41** 0.42** −0.03 0.23* 0.11 0.16 −0.01 –
12.  Fluency 0.04 0.02 0.26** 0.54** 0.49** 0.05 0.31* 0.20* 0.29** 0.01 0.60** –
13.  Flexibility −0.07 −0.01 0.14 0.24* 0.25** −0.09 −0.11 0.08 0.20* 0.06 0.45** 0.68** –
14.  Elaboration 0.25** 0.33** 0.26** 0.15 0.13 0.29** 0.20* 0.15 0.16 0.32** 0.40** 0.23* 0.15 –
15.  Feasibility 0.06 0.02 0.28** 0.56** 0.51** 0.07 0.32** 0.22** 0.31** 0.07 0.57** 0.94*** 0.63** 0.24** –
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
a Spearman’s rho correlation coefﬁcients were computed for categorical variables, i.e., gender and sympathy condition.
Table 4
Creativity measures as a function of induced sympathy in Study 2.
Induced Sympathy (n = 62) Control (n = 55) t
The Unusual Uses Task (UUT)
Originality 2.27 (2.70) 1.44 (1.51) −2.04*
Corrected Originality 0.34 (0.39) 0.18 (0.18) −2.84**
Fluency 12.4 (4.4) 12.9 (6.7) 0.44
Flexibility 8.32 (2.36) 9.04 (3.67) 1.27
Elaboration 2.18 (2.36) 1.96 (2.32) −0.49
The  Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)
Originality 3.5 (3.2) 2.24 (2.64) −2.32*
Corrected Originality 0.38 (.32) 0.21 (0.19) −3.43**
Fluency 17.3 (8.3) 18 (10.2) 0.39
Flexibility 10.2 (3.3) 10.9 (4.01) 1.17
Elaboration 0.63 (1.22) 0.47 (0.92) −0.78
The  Floor Plan Task (FPT)
Originality 1.23 (1.4) 0.73 (1.4) −1.97*
Corrected Originality 0.24 (0.28) 0.10 (0.15) −3.35**
Fluency 4.8 (1.7) 5.2 (3.1) 0.91
Flexibility 2.4 (.99) 2.7 (1.4) 1.36
Elaboration 2.79 (2.30) 1.67 (1.48) −3.08**
Feasibility 4.44 (1.71) 4.62 (2.68) 0.45
Note: SDs are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
6.2.1. The Unusual Uses Test (UUT)
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that sympathy signiﬁcantly improved originality, t(115) = −2.04, p = 0.04, Cohen’s
d = −0.39. Participants in the sympathy condition showed greater originality than those in the control condition. A more
pronounced effect was observed when originality scores were corrected for ﬂuency (i.e., corrected originality), t(115) = −2.84,
p = 0.005, Cohen’s d = −0.65. However, sympathy did not inﬂuence ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, or elaboration, with all ps > 0.21. When
we also examined the content of participants’ responses, none of the participants generated uses that were related to the
elderly in particular.
6.2.2. The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WKCT)
Independent-samples t-tests were performed on creativity scores on the WKCT. Consistent with the results reported
above, sympathy signiﬁcantly improved originality, t(115) = −2.32, p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = −0.43, and corrected originality,
on creativity tasks, all ps = ns. In the same vein, our regression analysis also showed that gender did not predict any dimension of performance on creativity
tasks  (see Table 4), suggesting that gender did not inﬂuence the relation between sympathy and creativity.
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Fig. 1. The theoretical model that mediates between sympathy conditions and originality, as assessed by the Floor Plan Task. The overall amount of
elaboration per category was assessed as a proxy measure of persistence. a, b, c, and c-prime are the path coefﬁcients (unstandardized regression weights,
with  standard errors in parentheses). Path coefﬁcient c represents the total effect of induced sympathy on originality. Path coefﬁcient c-prime refers to the
direct  effect of sympathy on originality. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant regression paths * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.05.
t(115) = −3.4, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = −0.64, but did not inﬂuence ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, or elaboration, all ps > 0.25. Notably, the
two groups did not differ in responses that were related to the elderly, t(115) = −0.94, p = 0.35.
6.2.3. The Floor Plan Task (FPT)
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that induced sympathy signiﬁcantly enhanced originality, t(115) = −1.97, p = 0.05,
Cohen’s d = −0.37, corrected originality, t(115) = −3.35, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = −0.63, and elaboration, t(115) = −3.08, p=0.003,
Cohen’s d = −0.58. It did not, however, inﬂuence ﬂuency t(115) = 0.91, p = 0.36 or ﬂexibility, t(115) = 1.36, p = 0.18. We  further
examined feasibility for ideas generated in the FPT to examine whether the idea can be implemented for a moderate cost;
1 point was assigned to a moderately to highly feasible idea. Sympathy did not affect the feasibility of ideas, t(115) = 0.45,
p = 0.66, suggesting that increased originality under sympathetic feelings is not necessarily attained at the expense of an
idea’s feasibility.
In sum, induced sympathy facilitated more original ideas, demonstrating sympathy’s robust effects on originality. This
observed effect held true even when ﬂuency was taken into account, and was observed across three different measures of
creativity that require either domain-general knowledge (i.e., the UUT and WKCT) or domain-speciﬁc knowledge (i.e., the
FPT). Moreover, induced sympathy facilitated elaboration but this effect was  found in the content-speciﬁc creativity task
(i.e., FPT) only. In contrast, induced sympathy did not affect the other dimensions of creativity, i.e., ﬂuency and ﬂexibility.
6.3. The mediating role of persistence
We  tested the prediction of the dual-pathway model (Nijstad et al., 2010), which postulates that activating negative mood
states increases originality via persistence. Although Nijstad et al. operationalized persistence as an increased category depth
(i.e., the tendency to generate ideas within the same category), our dataset was  not coded to index persistence in the same
manner. Therefore, we approximated persistence by the average amount of spontaneous elaboration per category, since
greater elaboration is likely driven by persistence in providing details. Consistent, in part, with the dual-pathway model, we
found that persistence fully mediated the effect of sympathy on originality, whereas ﬂexibility did not (Fig. 1). The direct
effect of sympathy on creative originality was reduced to nonsigniﬁcance ( = 0.25, p > 0.05) when persistence was  included
in the analyses, and persistence was a signiﬁcant predictor of originality ( = 3.14, p < 0.05). This mediation effect was not
found in the domain-general creativity tasks, i.e., the unusual uses and Wallach-Kogan tasks.
6.4. Individual differences in trait empathy
To examine the relationship between induced sympathy and trait empathy, multiple moderation analyses were per-
formed using the regression model with respect to originality scores obtained from three kinds of creativity tasks. In these
analyses, sympathy was entered as an independent variable, trait empathy as a moderator, and originality scores as an
outcome variable (Hayes, 2013).
Regarding originality scores assessed by domain-general tests of creativity (UUT and WKCT), the moderating effect of trait
empathy was signiﬁcant: for UUT,  = 2.71, p = 0.004, 95% conﬁdence interval (.89–4.53); for WKCT,  = 3.17, p = 0.01, 95%
conﬁdence interval (.73–5.61). Further analyses revealed that sympathy facilitated originality, especially among participants
high in trait empathy: for UUT,  = 2.02, p < 0.001; for WKCT,  = 2.68, p < 0.001. However, this effect was not found among
those low in trait empathy: for UUT,  = −0.38, p = 0.50; for WKCT,  = −0.14, p = 0.86.
On the other hand, trait empathy did not moderate the effect of sympathy on originality measured by the domain-speciﬁc
test of creativity (FPT). Further analyses, however, revealed patterns similar to those shown above. The conditional effects
of induced sympathy on originality were still signiﬁcant when participants’ empathy trait was  high –  = 0.91, p = 0.01, 95%
conﬁdence interval (0.20–1.61) – or moderate –  = 0.51, p = 0.04, 95% conﬁdence interval (0.02–1.00) – but not when it was
low,  = 0.11, p = 0.75, 95% conﬁdence interval (−0.59–0.82). Together, our moderation analyses showed that the beneﬁcial
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Table 5
Results of hierarchical regression analyses in Study 2.
Hierarchical step Originality Corrected originality Fluency Flexibility
R2  ˇ t R2  ˇ t R2  ˇ t R2  ˇ t
The Unusual Uses Task
S1: Gender 0.009 −0.09 −0.99 0.003 −0.06 −0.61 0.012 −0.11 −1.18 0.03 −0.16 −1.77
S2:  Trait Empathy 0.012 0.16 1.55 0.02 0.16 1.52 0.014 −0.13 −1.3 0.014 −0.13 −1.29
S3:  Induced Sympathy 0.039 0.19 2.18* 0.07 0.27 2.95** 0.001 −0.03 −0.35 0.01 −0.11 −1.14
The  Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test
S1: Gender 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.001 −0.01 −0.05 0.01 0.15 1.49 0.011 0.16 1.55
S2:  Trait Empathy 0.01 −0.08 −0.82 0.00 0.002 0.02 0.01 −0.12 −1.23 0.009 −0.11 −1.03
S3:  Induced Sympathy 0.04 0.21 2.29* 0.09 0.31 3.39** 0.002 −0.05 −0.52 0.014 −0.12 −1.29
The  Floor Flan Task
S1: Gender 0.00 0.08 0.81 0.015 0.14 1.41 0.009 −0.02 −0.21 0.001 0.02 0.23
S2:  Trait Empathy 0.04 −0.21 −2.1* 0.01 −0.11 −1.09 0.02 −0.16 −1.56 0.01 −0.11 −1.08
S3:  Induced Sympathy 0.03 0.18 1.96* 0.08 0.29 3.23** 0.006 −0.08 −.85 0.02 −0.13 −1.34
Note: *p < 0.05, **p  < 0.01.
effect of sympathy on originality was most evident among those with high trait empathy, which highlights the moderating
role of individual differences in one’s empathic characteristics (i.e., trait empathy).
6.5. Predictive relationship between induced sympathy and creativity
Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were performed to examine the predictive relationship of induced sympathy and
creativity, as assessed by three measures (Table 5). We  entered gender, trait empathy, and induced sympathy, in that order,
into the hierarchical regression model with respect to originality, ﬂuency, and ﬂexibility scores as the dependent variables,
respectively. We  found that when the effects of both gender and trait empathy were controlled for, only induced sympathy
emerged as a signiﬁcant predictor of originality, as assessed by all measures of creativity. When corrected originality was
entered as a dependent variable, sympathy emerged as a more pronounced predictor across all creativity tasks. However,
when the same regression model was applied with respect to either ﬂuency or ﬂexibility as a dependent variable, induced
sympathy predicted neither ﬂuency nor ﬂexibility. Together, this suggests that induced sympathy is particularly beneﬁcial
for originality in creative performance.
7. Discussion
Sympathy has typically been acknowledged to be, and has been widely studied as, a prosocial and moral emotion in a social
domain. Little is known, however, about its cognitive beneﬁts; it will therefore be valuable to gain a better understanding
of the potential beneﬁts of sympathy in a cognitive domain. Given the lack of studies of the cognitive consequences of
sympathy, our most noteworthy ﬁnding is that regardless of the content domain, sympathy inﬂuences originality but does
not affect ﬂuency or ﬂexibility. In addition, our ﬁndings demonstrate an important interaction between state sympathy and
trait-level empathy in inﬂuencing originality in creative performance. Consistent with the feeling-as-information model
and the mood-as-input model (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2003; see also the mood-as-input model, Martin & Stoner, 1996), our
results suggest that sympathy – as a discrete negative emotion that is construed as socially desirable and adaptive in a given
context – promotes creativity.
It is important to consider potential mechanisms for the link between sympathy and originality. We  believe that the
most plausible pathways may  be related to both affective and motivational routes. Because sympathy arises from sorrow
or concern for a person who is suffering (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978), sympathy is considered to be a negative emotion
that stresses a situation’s drawbacks and stimulates heightened attention to a socially desirable and altruistic solution. As
a result, sympathy is likely to enhance intrinsic motivation to pursue a creative and original solution that helps alleviate
others’ distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Watt, 2005). The literature consistently suggests that other-oriented emotions such
as sympathy tend to promote prosocial tendencies and moral and altruistic actions such as helping, comforting, and sharing,
all of which are driven by intrinsic motivation (e.g., Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). Moreover, consistent in part with the
dual-pathway model (Nijstad et al., 2010), our preliminary analysis suggests that cognitive persistence partially mediates
the effect of sympathy on creative performance especially in the content-speciﬁc creativity task (i.e., FPT). A solid link,
therefore, appears to exist between sympathy and intrinsic motivation, which in turn promotes creativity via exploration
and persistence (Amabile, 1996; Grant & Berry, 2011; Shalley et al., 2004).
Moreover, sympathy may  implicate regulatory controls that are conducive to creativity; research has documented a
positive association between sympathy and self-regulation. For example, sympathetic reactions are linked to high attentional
and emotional regulation and coping behaviors (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg, 2000; Rothbart, Ahadi,
& Hershey, 1994). Given the literature that has demonstrated self-regulatory behaviors as resources for achieving creative
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outcomes (Chiu, 2014; De Stobbeleir, Ashford, & Buyens, 2011), it is possible that sympathy facilitates creativity through its
regulatory mechanisms, which help to guide and monitor goal-directed activities.
It is worthwhile to discuss why sympathy did not inﬂuence ﬂexibility dimension of creativity. Given the literature that
suggests that perspective taking promotes creativity by integrating diverse views (Gardner, Gino, & Staats, 2011; Hoever,
Knippenberg, van Ginkel, & Barkema, 2012), we  expected that sympathy – which facilitates perspective taking – would
enhance the ﬂexibility aspect of creativity. However, given that sympathy is more usually evoked by affective perspective
taking – i.e., understanding the feelings of the stimulus person – than cognitive perspective taking – i.e., the thoughts of the
stimulus person – sympathy’s null effect on ﬂexibility suggests that affective perspective taking may  play a less critical role
in fostering ﬂexibility in creative performance. Future studies are therefore warranted to illuminate the effects of affective
vs. cognitive perspective taking on creative ﬂexibility.
Our study is not without drawbacks, which should be addressed in future work. First, it was  designed to examine the
immediate effect of induced sympathy on creativity, and therefore the facilitating effect of sympathy is likely short-lived.
Although it would be intriguing to examine how long this observed effect of sympathy lasts, it is beyond our intended
goal and should be pursued in future studies. Our ﬁndings, therefore, should not be generalized to the long-term effects of
sympathy or trait sympathy. Second, it is possible that young college students may  have felt suspicious about being asked
about ageism. It is noteworthy, however, that we  tried to minimize participants’ awareness and suspicions about the scale’s
purpose by adding unrelated ﬁller items to the ageism scale. When the funnel questionnaire was administered at the end of
the study – in which we asked participants what they believed the study’s purpose to be and whether any part of the study
seemed suspicious – we found that none of our participants correctly guessed the hypothesis or reported feeling suspicious
about the ageism scale. Third, the typical pretest-posttest design was  not employed for creativity assessment because of the
constraints associated with administering multiple domain-general and domain-speciﬁc tests of creativity within a limited
time frame. We  acknowledge, however, that the pretest-posttest design will provide a clearer and more accurate view of
the effect of sympathy on creativity; therefore, future studies that employ a careful pretest-posttest control are warranted.
Lastly, although we used the avoidance subscale as a manipulation check on induced sympathy, we acknowledge that it is still
an indirect measure of sympathy. Speciﬁcally, one could argue that mitigated avoidance tendency in the sympathy condition
may not necessarily stem from sympathetic feelings toward the distressed elderly. We  believe that this is a legitimate concern
that must be addressed since the images of afﬂicted elderly may  have induced more generically negative feelings, rather than
a speciﬁc emotion such as sympathy. However, our data suggest that this is not the case. Speciﬁcally, if negative moods were
induced, signiﬁcant group differences should have been observed in participants’ self-reported ratings of unpleasantness.
Instead, we found that the two groups did not differ in reported negative mood (Table 2). In addition, we found that the
images of distressed elderly showed a discriminant validity, such that those images inﬂuenced avoidance tendency – which
is viewed as a more malleable state characteristic – but not the other subscales, which are more closely related to trait-like
characteristics (i.e., antilocution and discrimination). Therefore, reduced avoidance tendency in the sympathy condition can
be attributed to the experience of sympathy.
In conclusion, given that sympathy is usually evoked by heightened awareness of and concern for others’ suffering by
perceiving or reacting to their distress or need, our study suggests that sympathetic feelings enhance originality, especially
via its affective and motivational routes. Although our test of the dual-pathway model suggests that sympathy enhances
originality via persistence, it is unclear why this effect was found only in the context-speciﬁc creativity task. Given that
various factors (e.g., age, gender, test item, training) inﬂuence content-speciﬁc creative ideation (Agogué, Poirel, Pineau,
Houdé, & Cassotti, 2014; Hong, Peng, O’Neil, Wu,  2013), future research is warranted on speciﬁc individual-difference factors
which may  modulate the persistence pathway to creative performance. Importantly, more studies are needed to investigate
cognitive mechanisms (e.g., heuristics, inhibitory control, and expansion) that drive the effects of sympathy on creative
processes (Agogué et al., 2014). Especially given that sympathy involves motivational, affective, and regulatory aspects
(Lamm et al., 2007), future work should identify the speciﬁc pathways by which sympathy promotes creativity. It will also
be worthwhile to examine the effects of other related (empathic) feelings (e.g., compassion or pity), various distinct and
speciﬁc emotions (e.g., gratitude or anger), and the moderating role of individual differences (e.g., personality traits) on
creative performance.
This study has important implications for many settings in which creativity is considered vital. Teachers, parents, and
employers strive to stimulate creativity in their students, children, and employees through various cognitive activities
and exercises. Although the effectiveness of these cognitive approaches has been widely studied, little is known about
the important role emotional factors play in promoting creativity. Given that sympathy has typically been acknowledged
to be a prosocial and moral emotion in a social domain, it will therefore be valuable to gain a better understanding of the
potential link between sympathy and creative cognition in many areas (including education, development, and organization).
Speciﬁcally, fostering sympathy toward needy individuals in the classroom or organization may  facilitate one’s creative
thinking. Similarly, the school curriculum that is designed to develop and promote sympathy among young children may
make a meaningful contribution to boosting creativity in classroom practices. Given the scarcity of research on sympathy,
we must continue to expand our understanding of how the emotional experience of sympathy can positively affect our
cognitive, social, and organizational lives.
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